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THE HEALTH PAPERSWith annual spending of about $4.5 billion dollars in 2010, Canada’s largest drug plan – the
Ontario Drug Program (ODB) – will become harder to afford as the babyboomers age and
workforce growth slows. A business-as-usual approach to funding the plan, which provides
publicly funded drug benefits to every Ontario resident aged 65 an older, presents a bleak
prospect and amounts to wilfully passing on an exorbitant bill to future generations.
Looking at a past sustainability challenge to a key Canadian social-insurance program, the
reforms to the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) in the late 1990s may offer some lessons for ODB
reform. In particular, an early increase in contributions to partially prefund future liabilities
would limit growth in contribution rates later on.
A plan to partially prefund the ODB would be the equivalent of asking citizens to sacrifice
consumption on other goods and services today to help cover the cost of drugs they will 
need later, without imposing problematically higher taxes on tomorrow’s workers. Higher
contributions in the near term could go into an ODB fund, with its investment returns helping
to support drug spending in the decades to come. 
A complementary reform would restructure the ODB’s expenditures to provide part of its
payments to individuals, rather than as direct reimbursements to suppliers. These payments,
which could be used largely or entirely to purchase drug-related insurance from competing
providers, would inject more individual autonomy, choice, and sensitivity to the costs and
benefits of alternative treatments, into drug purchases in Ontario. 
Ontario, like all jurisdictions, faces tough challenges at the intersection of fiscal and health policy.
Partial prefunding and benefit-payment reform of the ODB would put a key health program on
a stronger and more sustainable footing.
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P
ublicly funded healthcare is a
point of pride to Canadians, a
pillar of the welfare state to
many actual and potential users of
health services – and a concern to
those who wonder how we will cover
the growing needs and desires of an
aging population from a constrained
tax base. 
Provincial budgets regularly highlight the fact that
healthcare spending is outpacing other programs
and revenues. A prominent concern in this
troubling commentary is the increasing cost of
drug programs, which tend to outpace other
healthcare spending. These tendencies are long-
standing, as Figure 1 indicates for Ontario. 
Hence concerns that drug programs will be in the
vanguard of healthcare spending that forces taxes
ever higher or crowds out other government
programs, including some, such as education and
infrastructure, that have important benefits to
health as well.
The raw arithmetic behind these concerns is
daunting. Yet dramatic reactions – freezes on
prices or wholesale benefit cuts, for example – are
no more appropriate than despair. It is unremarkable
that the share of healthcare in Canadians’ spending
would rise over time: once a country is rich
enough that other necessities of life are largely
covered, healthcare is a natural priority. The key
challenge is to ensure that the benefits of extra
resources devoted to healthcare are attractive
relative to the costs – which on the benefits side
means getting good health payoffs, and on the
costs side means extracting the resources in 
ways that are economically tolerable now and 
in the future.
Both the benefits and the costs present
challenges – with a particular problem on the
costs side being the fact that public spending on
drugs is, whether as a matter of policy or a result
of health status, strongly geared to age. The task of
paying for pharmaceuticals for a relatively large
population of aging babyboomers therefore
appears likely to fall on a relatively small generation
of younger workers, who may find the cost
increasingly onerous. Figure 2 shows the results of
projecting the current pattern of age-specific
provincial spending under the Ontario Drug
Benefit (ODB)
1 as a share of provincial income
into the future, as demography raises the utilization
of the program and slows the growth of the
workforce that underpins provincial output and
incomes (Box 1). Even if these drugs produce
huge increases in future seniors’ quality of life,
levying the cost at the expense of other things
future younger workers will want for themselves
and their families raises the prospect of damage 
to the economy and, potentially, conflicts 
between generations.
One way to alleviate this pressure is partial
prefunding – setting aside additional resources in
the near term, while most babyboomers are still
economically active, to draw on in the future,
when they are retired. Since the share of drug
spending in the economy appears to be on a
relentlessly rising track, it might be wise to forgo
some near-term consumption of other goods and
services so that, as people age, they can spend
what they expect to on drugs without having to
drastically cut back spending on other things.
Using the ODB as a case study, this Commentary
describes how a social-insurance-inspired
pharmacare program, loosely modeled on the
example of the Canada Pension Plan (CPP),
The authors would like to thank Philippe Bergevin, Ake Blomqvist, Ben Dachis, Claude Forget, Finn Poschmann, Mark Stabile, and 
Aimee Sullivan for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. We would also like to thank Alexandre Laurin for his help with the 
Social Policy Simulation and Database/Model (SPSD/M) simulations in this paper.
1 The bulk of ODB spending is geared to age as a matter of policy. The next section presents the breakdown of drug expenditures by age of
beneficiary. Other details of these projections, which also underlie the simulations later in the paper, appear in Appendix A.C.D. Howe Institute
Box 1: Projecting ODB Spending
Source: CIHI (2010) and authors’ calculations.
Projections of spending in healthcare inevitably rely heavily on assumptions, which in turn inevitably
rely heavily on history. This projection, and the variations we use later in the paper, overlay changes in
demographics on an assumption of underlying spending increases about which experts will differ.
Our baseline rate in this projection is 6 percent nominal, which might be thought of as involving 
2 percent general inflation – the rate the Bank of Canada targets for the economy overall – plus some
combination of changes in costs specific to drugs covered by the ODB and changes in the volumes of
drugs consumed that sums to 4 percent. Some may feel that this 6 percent baseline overstates likely
increases in spending, since many of the drugs covered by the ODB are becoming less expensive over
time, in part because of expiry of patents. Other may feel that it understates likely increases because
price declines will be offset by volume increases for many of the same drugs, and/or because new drugs,
especially those tailored for ever-more specific conditions or predispositions, will drive per-recipient
spending up faster than in the past. Given these uncertainties, the inevitable tendency is to project
trends similar to those we have seen recently – hence the 6 percent figure.
The 6 percent baseline interacts with demographic change to raise ODB expenditures by 8.5 percent
each year, on average, over the next 20 years – a slight deceleration from the 9.4 percent annual
increases of the past 20 years. After 2030, the demographic factors taper off somewhat and the overall
growth rate falls, converging to about 6.0 percent annually in 50 years’ time.
Critics of healthcare cost projections that assume current age-specific expenditure patterns will
continue point out that the older population is getting healthier and that life expectancy is increasing. 
If that is so, current age-related increases in spending will occur later in life in the future. The same
consideration would apply to the ODB if its payments were triggered only by patient needs, but the
fact that age is key to eligibility will mute the impact of increases in healthy life expectancy. Only if the
age of eligibility rose along with healthy life expectancy would the delays in people’s need for drugs
translate straightforwardly into later age-specific utilization rates.
That said, several reviewers of this paper pointed out that unlike in the past, the many upward
pressures on pharmacare costs are likely to abate in future years as large patents expire, more generic
drugs come to market, the rate of introducing new “breakthrough” drugs falls, and recent policy
reforms to save costs take effect. For the later calculations in this paper we introduce a low growth path
for ODC expenditures of 5 percent – and a high growth scenario of 7 percent – to demonstrate the
range of outcomes under diverging drug program costs. We note, however, that the government of
Ontario has, at its disposal, significant tools to manage cost growth including management of the
formulary and, to a lesser extent, generic drug pricing arrangements. 
Projecting provincial income, the denominator for the ratio shown in Figure 1, also draws on history.
We project the workforce on the basis of the population of prime working age, multiply the number of
potential workers by an index of productivity that grows at historical rates of 1.5 percent annually per
personage 18-64, and assume overall inflation of 2 percent.
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might spread the costs of drugs for aging
babyboomers more evenly over time. It discusses
the mechanics of such a pharmacare program:
how contributions might be collected, how the
funds might be managed, and how the payouts
from the fund would support drug treatments by
participants. While many devils lurk in the details,
we argue further that complementary reforms to
the payouts from the program, as they affect
consumer choices of drug benefit delivery, could
improve the health bang per beneficiary buck. Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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Figure 1: Growth in Ontario’s Public Drug Costs, Total Health Costs, Government Revenues and 
Nominal GDP, 1981 – 2009E.
Source: CIHI (2010) and authors’ calculations.
Background: How the ODB Works and
What it Costs
Ontarians age 65 and over qualify for coverage of
prescription drugs under the ODB. Residents can
also qualify for ODB coverage if they reside in
long-term or special care homes, if they receive
support from Ontario Works or Ontario Disability,
if they receive professional home services or
qualify for the Trillium Drug Program.
2  In 2008,
with a total cost of roughly $4.1 billion, the ODB
accounted for about one-tenth of all healthcare
spending by the provincial government 
(CIHI 2010).
3
The ODB manages a list of covered drugs – a
formulary – and considers exceptional requests
case-by-case.
4 There are co-payments and
deductibles in the program: single income seniors
aged 65+ with annual income of $16,018 or more
and couples with income of $24,175 currently 
pay an annual deductable of $100 and pay up to
$6.11 towards a dispensing fee; people with
income below these levels pay $2.00 for each
prescription filled.
Sixty-nine percent of ODB beneficiaries in
2007 were seniors.
5 While private insurance covers
almost as large a share (36 percent) of the
population as the ODB (44 percent), it serves
2 The Trillium Drug Program is a program for Ontario residents, not based on age, who face relatively onerous prescription drug costs relative
to net household income.
3 Figures for 2007 show the ODB covering 44 percent of all spending on drugs in Ontario that year, with private insurers and patients paying
out-of-pocket covering the rest (Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care 2009).
4 In 2007/08, the exceptional access program cost about $224 million, or about 6 percent of all ODB costs. This is up from 1.5 percent of
ODB costs in 1998/99.
5 Trillium beneficiaries make up about 6 percent; the remaining 25 percent of beneficiaries qualify either through social assistance or are
residents of special care homes (Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care 2009).
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6 The movement of the babyboomers out of traditional workforce age, which these projections assume happens at age 65, depresses the
income that is the denominator of the ratio in Figure 2, a key factor in the steep upward slope of the line.
7 The principle of partial prefunding is evident in the US Medicare, which provides health insurance to individuals age 65 and older. Much of
the spending in that program, such as that on hospital inpatient stays in Part A, is financed by payroll-tax contributions to a trust fund. In
practice, however, the holdings of this trust fund are exclusively nonmarketable federal government securities – an internal IOU. So it is
















































Figure 2: Past and Projected Ontario Drug Benefit Costs as a Percentage of GDP, 1981 – 2061.
Source: CIHI (2010) and authors’ calculations.
people under age 65 almost exclusively. So ODB
payments are much more strongly geared to age
than health expenditures generally (Figure 3A).
The number of people entitled to ODB by 
virtue of their age is about to expand sharply
(Figure 3B). This movement of babyboomers 
into the age groups that use the program more
heavily is a critical factor driving the steep upward
slope in the spending line in Figure 2 in the
coming decades. There is about one Ontarian
aged 65 and older for every five Ontarians of
traditional workforce age (18 to 64) at present;
current fertility and trend migration rates 
(see Appendix A, Table 1 for the complete
demographic assumptions) imply that in 2060,
there will be one senior for roughly every two
potential workers.
6
CPP-Style Prefunding: An Overview
The explicit targeting of much of the ODB to
seniors raises a question: why not treat these
benefits more like pensions, which are also
strongly geared to age, but which we assume will
be at least partly funded by the same people or age
cohort who will one day draw them down,
through saving during their younger lives?
7 ODB
funding is now pay-as-you-go: setting aside
government deficits, each dollar spent is financed
by taxes raised at the time. In the mid-1990s, theCommentary 326 | 5






















Beneficiaries in 2010 Beneficiaries in 2030 (projected)
0-14  15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84  85+
Figure 3B: ODB Beneficiaries Set to Expand, 2010 vs. 2030 Projections
Source: Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (2009) and authors’ calculations.




















Figure 3A: Ontario Drug Benefit Expenditures by Age Group, 2007/08.
Source: Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (2009) and authors’ calculations.| 6 Commentary 326
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CPP and its Quebec counterpart, the Quebec
Pension Plan, moved from pay-as-you-go funding
– which also threatened to make future workers
pay much larger contributions for their benefits
than their predecessors had done – to a partially
prefunded status that moved contribution rates
higher in the short run to build a fund intended
to forestall further increases.
8
Adapting this approach for the ODB was first
proposed by Robson (2002) and we provided
modeling results for an updated paper on the
subject by Stabile and Greenblatt (2010). To
elaborate how such an approach might work, we
focus on the old-age coverage of the ODB, and
assume that the Ministry of Long-Term Care
continues other elements of the program under
the same provisions that exist today.
9 Our
assumption for this exercise is that Ontario
continues to target much of its drug coverage on
the basis of age; as we discuss later, prefunding in
this way would not preclude moving toward a
more need-based system, but the existing age-
related structure makes the projections more
straightforward. We also note that partial
prefunding creates an opportunity to restructure
payments out of the plan – a topic we explore
later in this paper.
8 The Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) was not fully pay-as-you-go: it had a longer benefit phase-in period than the CPP in order to build an
investment fund. Disappointing performance on many of those investments and particularly adverse demographics, however, meant that the
QPP also faced decades of continually escalating contribution rates. Economic and demographic pressures are now forcing the QPP to raise
its “steady-state” rate.
9 As we discuss below, other reforms to drug coverage may be desirable: our partial prefunding would not preclude them. See Appendix A for
the assumptions used in ODB costs projections with and without a focus on seniors.


















$ billion % $ $ $ billion
Low Return on Fund Assets: 3%
Low Spending Growth (5%) 7.4 1.8 855 1,190 362
Baseline Spending Growth (6%) 11.9 2.6 1,373 1,711 573
High Spending Growth (7%) 18.6 3.7 2,148 2,490 878
Moderate Return on Fund Assets: 5%
Low Spending Growth (5%) 5.7 1.5 662 997 189
Baseline Spending Growth (6%) 9.0 2.1 1,044 1,382 295
High Spending Growth (7%) 13.9 2.9 1,605 1,946 444
High Return on Fund Assets: 7%
Low Spending Growth (5%) 4.4 1.3 505 893 105
Baseline Spending Growth (6%) 6.7 1.7 779 1,117 160
High Spending Growth (7%) 10.2 2.3 1,172 1,513 237Commentary 326 | 7
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The Numbers
We begin with the aggregate numbers. How large
an increase in funding in the near term would
stop the claim of the age-related part of the ODB
on Ontarians’ current incomes from rising
indefinitely, as in Figure 1, and instead stabilize it
after the initial jump? The answer depends on the
rates of spending growth in the program and the
rates of return earned on investments of revenue
not needed for current spending and invested in a
new ODB Fund.
We show the results for three potential rates of
underlying spending growth (independent of
demographic change) and three potential rates of
return on investment (Table 1). Although people
commonly think of projections such as these as
describing processes over which policymakers have
little control, ODB spending is in a meaningful
sense a policy choice: the government picks what
treatments and drugs to cover and set
reimbursement rates, so we choose rates of
increase that are more conservative than past
trends and appear to be in a range of financially
and politically acceptable outcomes. We find:
￿ Under the most favourable of our assumptions –
those under which the immediate hike in ODB
funding that makes further hikes unnecessary for
50 years is smallest – the immediate hike is $4.4
billion, or roughly $500 per person aged 18-64. 
￿ Under the least favourable assumptions, the
immediate hike is $18.6 billion, or about $2,150
per working-age person. 
￿ Under the assumptions we adopt for our baseline
scenario – underlying spending growth of 6
percent and moderate, 5 percent returns on
investment – the immediate hike is $9.0 billion, or
$1,040 per working-age person. In other words,
Ontarians would need to pay an additional $9.0
billion annually – above the pay-as-you-go rate –
to partially prefund the old-age components of the
ODB that currently cost $3.1 billion. With high
returns to investment and the same underlying
spending growth, the increase would be $6.7
billion or $780 for each working-aged person.
These are big numbers: the immediate hike in our
baseline scenario is 2.1 percent of provincial
income. Yet the counterpart of more money into
the program in the near term is less money into it
in the longer term. If we think of the provincial
government’s implicit promise to provide the
ODB in its current form, but not raise taxes to
finance it, as a commitment Queen’s Park should
show on its balance sheet, it amounts to an
unfunded liability of some $295 billion.
10 The
provincial government has implicitly committed
to maintain benefits under this program as the
population ages, and thereby has implicitly
committed taxpayers to pay for them. The bill 
will arrive: the question is whether to pay some 
of it sooner, or leave it all for later.
In a nutshell, our proposal would see revenues
earmarked for the ODB, with funds raised by an
incremental boost deposited into an ODB Fund.
Following the boost in contributions, net
additional revenues would flow into the Fund and
investment returns would further boost its size.
Later on, the net flow of revenues into the Fund
would reverse, preventing the tax increases that
would otherwise occur (as illustrated for the
moderate investment income, baseline spending
scenario in Figure 4).
The Benefits of Prefunding in Principle
Just as the proposal to prefund the CPP was
controversial back in the mid-1990s, many would
argue for leaving the entire bill for higher future
10 Demographic change creates implicit assets and liabilities for governments. In situations where demography will lower the cost of a program
– children’s benefits declining as the number of children falls, for example – a government could carry additional debt and still meet the total
costs of the program plus the debt at unchanged tax rates: the program creates an implicit asset. Where demography will increase the cost of
a program – as is the case with healthcare – a government would need additional assets to meet those costs without raising taxes: the program
creates an implicit liability. Discounting the change in income over 50 years, roughly the life expectancy of the average-aged Canadian, allows
us to quantify the implicit assets and liabilities created by these political promises. Robson (2010) undertakes such an exercise for the federal,
provincial and territorial governments for four categories of demographically sensitive spending.| 8 Commentary 326
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ODB costs until the future arrives. In a critique of
Stabile and Greenblatt (2010), Grignon (2010)
called the benefits of tax smoothing over time and
mitigating intergenerational transfers opaque, and
argued that drugs are no better a candidate for
prefunding than any other element of healthcare.
We disagree. Absent an improbably large pick-
up in productivity growth, demography and
underlying ODB spending increases – even at
rates lower than experienced so far – will push tax
rates up. As with other government obligations
that are poorly measured and/or understood,
anticipation of this higher spending does not
appear to have prompted offsetting behaviour –
higher public- or private-sector saving, for
example – and it is hard to see what cuts in other
public programs would offset these higher revenue
demands as they arrive. Since the economically
damaging effects of taxes – their discouraging
effects on work and saving, for example, or the
incentive they create to work in the underground
economy – get exponentially worse as tax rates
rise, stabilizing tax rates over time can lower those
costs on average over the period. Knowingly
passing a higher bill to the future than we
ourselves are prepared to pay raises other concerns
– among them, doubts about the willingness and
ability of future Canadians to pay the higher
amounts we passed them, with the possible
consequence that the program suffers cuts.
11
11 Grignon (2010) argues that future generations will benefit from pharmaceutical R&D paid for by current contributors, but since the benefits
of R&D in any jurisdiction are likely to flow predominantly to people outside it, it is hard to see why this would increase either the















































Figure 4: Prefunding the Old-Age ODB Program, Net Additional Revenues and Expenses as a Percentage 
of GDP, Moderate Investment Returns Baseline Spending, 2010-2061. 
Source: Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (2009) and authors’ calculations.Commentary 326 | 9
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While it might make sense to prefund other
parts of the publicly funded healthcare budget for
these reasons, age-related pharmacare is a uniquely
attractive candidate for such treatment precisely
because it is geared to age. The case for prefunding
doctor and hospital care is weaker – and, as we
discuss later, the case for prefunding non-age-
related pharmacare is also weaker – since an
important share of public spending on these
programs benefits persons who are still of working
age. In the case of drugs, the logic of a person
paying in while young to draw a benefit when old
is more straightforward: most working-age people
rely on private pharmacare coverage; at age 65,
most Ontarians – as well as their counterparts in
most provinces – shift to public coverage.
That logic also raises another attractive
possibility: that social-insurance-style financing to
partially prefund the ODB would create additional
confidence in the sustainability of the program. To
the extent that it does, and particularly to the
extent that individual contributions give rise to
individual benefit entitlements, the immediate
hike will feel less like a tax increase – people who
feel they are paying for a benefit are less likely to
avoid or evade a levy. Reaping that benefit, however,
depends on the assurance they have that the fund’s
assets will be used as intended, an issue in which
the details of the reform will matter a good deal.
12
The Devilish Details
While partial prefunding is attractive for many of
the same reasons partial funding of the CPP was
attractive, the collection of contributions to a
prefunded pharmacare program and – even more
important – the payment of benefits out of it will
differ in important ways from the CPP model. 
We have shown some potential aggregate or 
per-adult costs to prefund the seniors’ portion of
the ODB (Table 1), assuming the same future
pattern of expenditures under the current old-age
portion of the ODB. How, then, might those
funds be raised, managed, and distributed?
Possible Mechanics of Partially
Prefunded Pharmacare
A key premise for this exercise is that the ODB
continues to be a mandatory program. The
arguments for mandatory health-insurance
coverage are well known, and have parallels in
other social-security programs: pooling risk over
an entire population mitigates adverse selection
problems that can undermine voluntary schemes.
Within that overall framework, however, many
key questions remain.
The Contributions
Contributions to a partially prefunded ODB
could continue to come from general government
revenue – meaning that the $9 billion, or
whichever figure from Table 1 is most apt, would
come from a general tax hike. Judging that a
general tax hike would be less obviously linked to
a benefit, and therefore both more economically
damaging and less likely to inspire confidence in
the ODB’s promises than a dedicated levy, we
favour an earmarked ODB contribution that at
least partially links a participant’s benefit package
to her or his contributions – at a minimum,
gearing entitlements to the contribution period.
13
The partially prefunded ODB could levy such a
contribution on different bases. One straightforward
way of expressing the social-insurance ideal is to
levy a specific charge per working-age person per
year – a kind of poll tax – that would escalate with
12 Joanis, Boisclair and Montmarquette (2004, 42) raise some of the operational challenges in making healthcare prefunding work. We address
some of them below.
13 Normal economic analysis highlights the importance of incremental payments yielding incremental benefits at the individual level. Perfect
matching of personal costs and benefits makes contributions to a program akin to payments for a good or service, and in that sense free of
the distortions created by taxes. We judge that the literature on “tax morale” justifies an assumption that people will more willingly pay a tax
when they are confident that the revenue will be used efficiently to fund a known program, which would make an earmarked revenue source
preferable even without perfect cost/benefit matching at the individual level.| 10 Commentary 326
C.D. Howe Institute
14 In the case of the CPP, the formal split of the levy has some implications for funding, since employer-side contributions in respect of
earnings that are less than the YBE do not get refunded, becoming a kind of surcharge to the plan that provides no benefit entitlement to 
the person in whose respect it was paid. This invisible payroll tax on low-income or short-term workers does not seem to us an attractive
precedent for a formal charge to employers.
15 These projections, like the ones that follow, are static in that they take no account of any adverse impacts of higher tax rates on 
economic growth.
wage growth over time. Imposing such a levy on
all employed people would create a severe
clawback of employment earnings at whatever
bottom threshold for employment income was
chosen. A second alternative that would avoid any
labour-market distortions – though induce no less
fierce political opposition – would be to impose it
on all people of working age. As noted above, this
option would impose a charge of about $1,000
per head in our baseline spending, 5 percent
returns scenario.
For the sake of pursuing social-insurance
precedents, including the CPP, more closely, we
also examine payroll-related charges levied on all
individuals in the workforce. The ODB
contributions in these scenarios would be a share
of wage and salary income above a low-income
threshold. Contributions would be charged on all
income above the threshold, and potentially
capped at a maximum income level.
Although it is not vital to the calculation of the
contribution rates, we should note that we model
these two employment-income-based contributions
as levies on individuals. Legally, this differs from
the CPP model, in which half the contributions
are formally charged to employers as a payroll tax,
and the other half to employees.
14 Empirical work
confirms the intuition of economists that the
formal incidence of these levies does not change
the fact that employees pay them in the form of
lower after-tax earnings (Gunderson and Hyatt
2008), so – although political saleability might
cause the government to formally charge part of
the levy to employers – we show the entire
contribution as employee-paid.
Having explored two options that resemble a
familiar social-insurance model, we also illustrate
a third that is quite different: an ODB contribution
levied on a consumption basis. This option has
the superficially appealing feature that it would
raise money not only from younger people, but
also from the older Ontarians who are already
eligible through the age-related portion of the
ODB. This apparent virtue is, however, also a key
defect from a social-insurance perspective. It is
hard to reconcile in principle with a model in which
people prepare when young for something they
will need when old; and problematic in terms of
designing the link between benefit entitlements
and contribution periods. The main motivation
for including it as an option is that taxes on
consumption generally inspire less damaging
behavioural responses than other taxes, and 
are favoured by economists for their less 
distorting qualities. 
A Per-Person ODB Levy: The individual levy
option, though doubtless very tough to sell
politically, is straightforward to model. We assume
that each working-age person would pay it, and
that it would escalate with wage growth. The new
levy to prefund the program would start at $1,040
per person aged 18 to 64 in our baseline scenario
for spending growth with high investment
returns, and at $1,370 per person in the same
spending-growth scenario with low investment
returns (Table 1).
15 Gross contributions, which
include the ongoing level of ODB funding for the
current pay-as-you-go plan as well as the new levy,
would be $1,380 per working-age person in our
baseline spending growth with high investment
returns scenario and $1,710 per person with low
investment returns.
ODB Contributions on Income from
Employment, Capped at the YMPE: For
convenience and familiarity, we model another
payroll tax option – ODB contributions levied on
income between a low-income threshold and aCommentary 326 | 11
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maximum – on the existing CPP contribution base.
This means contributions would be a share of
income from employment between the CPP’s
Year’s Basic Exemption (YBE), which is set at
$3,500 and does not change over time, and the
CPP’s Yearly Maximum Pensionable Earnings
(YMPE), which is currently $48,300 and rises
annually with changes in average earnings.
To raise the additional revenue required to
prefund the old-age components of the ODB, 
the immediate hike – which, to repeat, is intended
to be sufficient to preclude further increases for 
50 years – would be 4.5 percent of the
employment-earnings base up to the cap in our
baseline scenario for underlying spending with
moderate investment earnings (Table 2). In the
low-spending scenario, the immediate hike would
be 2.9 percent of that base; in the high-spending
scenario it would be 7.0 percent. The gross cost –
which, as above, would fund the pay-as-you-go
part of the ODB as well, and therefore be
offsettable by lower taxes elsewhere – would be
6.0 percent of earnings in our baseline scenario
with moderate investment earnings.
ODB Contributions on Income from
Employment, Capped at 1.5 times the YMPE: 
In the case of the CPP, the cap on contributions at
the YMPE is logically connected to the limit of
benefit coverage at the same level. As we discuss
below, payments from a prefunded ODB need not
– indeed, likely would not – have such a feature.
So the range of income for the ODB levy could be
larger – say, capped at 1.5 times the YMPE, which
would put it initially at $72,450.
With that higher cap, the additional revenue
required to prefund the old-age components of
the ODB would require an immediate hike of 
3.7 percent in our baseline scenario for underlying
spending with moderate investment earnings
(Table 2). In the low-spending scenario, the
immediate hike would be 2.3 percent of that base;
in the high-cost scenario it would be 5.7 percent.
The gross cost to cover prefunding plus ongoing
pay-as-you-go costs would be 4.9 percent of
earnings in our baseline scenario.
ODB Contributions on Income from
Employment, Uncapped: What about levying the
partial prefunding premium on all employment
income above the YBE? In that case, the hike
required to stabilize the contribution rate without
a cap would be 2.9 percent in the baseline
scenario, 1.8 percent in the low-spending scenario,
and 4.4 in the high-spending scenario (Table 2).
The gross cost in our baseline scenario with
moderate investment earnings would be 3.9 percent.
ODB Contributions on a Consumption 
Tax Base: If the payroll tax option, with
associated concerns about tradeoffs between caps,
rates and tax distortions, is unattractive, other
bases exist. Limiting tax-related distortions and
gearing contributions very straightforwardly to
ability to pay are considerations that point to
consumption as an attractive base.
Consumption taxes come in two broad types:
levies on income net of (registered) saving, or
levies on sales with credits for taxes paid at earlier
stages. Ontario’s HST is a variation on the second
of these. While far from perfect as a consumption
tax, with zero rates on certain categories of
expenditure, arbitrary rates on others that have
exempt status, and special treatment of certain
buyers and point-of-sale rebates, the HST has the
merit of being familiar and straightforward to
model. (It also features income-tax-related credits
that could serve as a model for any transfer
payments seen as helpful in cushioning the impact
of a new ODB levy on low-income groups.)
Levied as a share of the Ontario HST base, 
the required hike in ODB revenues to stabilize 
its contribution rate for 50 years would be 
4.8 percentage points in the baseline scenario, 
3.0 percentage points in the low-spending
scenario, and 7.6 percent – a hypothetical doubling
of the current provincial HST rate – in the high-
spending scenario (see Table 2 – we also discuss
the distributional impact of this levy across family
types in Appendix B). As noted already, the gross
cost of the potential new ODB levy would include
the pay-as-you-go elements – in this case, we| 12 Commentary 326
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presume that the removal of those pay-as-you-go
elements from the overall provincial budget would
allow an offsetting cut in the HST so that the
overall increase would reflect only the pre-funding.
Preferred Contribution Option: Choosing 
among these options is a matter of balancing quite
different considerations. The individual levy has
the virtue of being most like an insurance
premium. If the ODB benefit to which the levy
entitles the contributor is linked to contribution
period, for example – and abstracting from evasion
or other ways of gaming the system – striking a
good balance between the levy and the entitlement
could minimize individual unwillingness to pay it,
and thus minimize any related disincentives to
work or declare income. Its complete
disconnection from ability to pay, however (see
Appendix B), would count heavily against it.
The HST-like levy is, as taxes go, relatively
undistorting – it may encourage the underground
economy for some transactions, but the
disincentives it creates to work and saving are
smaller than those of most other taxes. Unless the
levy were on annual consumption, however, it
would be completely disconnected from benefit
entitlement – which would mean that any
distortions it did create would be unmitigated –
and incompatible with the social-insurance
inspiration of the reform.
In our view, the social-insurance model makes
the payroll-related levies most attractive, in
relative terms, and also limits the extent to which
redistribution should be an explicit goal of the
financing system. One key trade-off, then, is
between the distortions created by a high
contribution rate and those created by a wide
income-range over which the contribution rate
applies. For the sake of concreteness, we would
suggest focusing on the middle payroll-tax option
– which, to repeat, would put it at 3.7 percentage
points in our preferred scenario. If this option
proved politically saleable, it would create more
redistributive distortions within age cohorts than
the lower-cap or per-person alternatives, for the
sake of an overall reform that would limit
redistributions among them.
The ODB Fund
The additional revenues collected by the levies just
discussed would buy income-earning assets in an
ODB Fund, and the proceeds from those
investments would flow to ODB beneficiaries to
pay for drugs. Two related questions, both familiar
Table 2: Additional (and Steady-State) Contribution Rates on Different Tax Bases for Prefunding, 2011














Moderate Rate of Return,
Low-Spending Scenario ($5.7B)
2.9 2.3 1.8 3.0
Moderate Rate of Return,
Baseline-Spending Scenario ($9.0B)
4.5 3.7 2.9 4.8
Moderate Rate of Return,
High-Spending Scenario ($13.9B)
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from the CPP debate, arise about this Fund: how
to govern the investments themselves; and how to
improve the likelihood that the assets and the
income they yield will support the ODB instead
of being diverted to some other purpose.
In the CPP’s case, joint federal-provincial
responsibility for the plan proved advantageous:
the Investment Board that oversees the
contributions and investment earnings not needed
to pay benefits is appointed jointly by, and
accountable separately to, both levels of
government. An important corollary of this
arrangement is that the CPP’s income, expenditure
and balance sheet are not consolidated with those
of the federal government.
16 This structure helps
insulate the CPP’s funds from governments that
might want to divert them to political goals, and
creates transparency and accountability that likely
increase Canadians’ confidence that they will
support CPP benefits as promised.
No parallel option exists for Ontario, since no
subprovincial entities with independent
constitutional status akin to that of the provinces
within Canada exist. The province’s best route to
duplicating some of those features might be
through a trust. Ontario already has large trusts
whose revenues, expenses, assets and liabilities are
not part of the consolidated financial statements
of the provincial government. The Workplace
Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB), the Ontario
Teachers’ Pension Plan, and the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Fund (PBGF) are prominent examples.
Trusts are generally excludable from the books
of the province because the government is
supposed to have neither access to the funds in
them, nor responsibility to cover any shortfalls.
The ODB Fund would publish its own financial
reports. The substantive corollary of this financial
reporting would be protection for the Fund: if
fiscal pressure were to force future Ontario
governments to cut public spending, for example,
it would create a bulwark against those cuts
affecting drug benefits to the retired.
A trust structure is, by itself, no guarantee
against political direction of the operation of a
fund, or justification for its exclusion from the
province’s financial statements. The provincial
auditor has, for example, recently questioned the
non-consolidation of the WSIB and the PBGF
(AGO 2009).
17 A clear mandate to invest in the
sole interest of plan members, appropriate
financial reporting, and a board of directors
appointed through a process outside the direct
control of provincial ministers and officials could
strengthen the independence of the ODB Fund. 
It is possible to imagine a condominium
structure for an ODB Fund that would give
formal representation in its governance to
subprovincial bodies – the Local Health Integration
Networks (LHINs), for example. None of these
measures provides iron-clad political protection or
justification for nonconsolidated financial
reporting, but the combination would be equal to
the state of the art for any such non-federal-
provincial structure in Canada.
The Payments
The discussion up to this point of the collection
of additional revenues and their investment in a
Fund to stabilize the current-contribution cost of
the ODB has no necessary implications for the
way benefits should be paid. The current approach
to paying benefits – out of a collective pool
whenever the joint actions of prescribers,
pharmacists and patients create the demand –
could continue as it would without prefunding –
or, preferably, the reforms could include a new
16 Public Sector Accounting Handbook, Section PS 1300.07.
17 Controversially, the Auditor General of Ontario has made numerous objections to the financial independence of the WSIB and the PBGF,
both of which stem from the growing unfunded liabilities of each trust. These liabilities, it becomes clearer over time, are the responsibility of
the province. The ODB plan, however, should not face any serious net liability challenge in the short run as asset growth is planned to
greatly outstrip liabilities. Nonetheless, the Auditor’s assessment of whether, under public-sector accounting board definitions, the
government of Ontario controls the WSIB and PBGF has led to the conclusion that both programs should not be assessed as trusts and
should be included in the consolidated financial statements (AGO 2009).| 14 Commentary 326
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type of payment to individuals linked to their
contribution history and subject to more discretion
on their part than the current system involves.
The Appeal and Drawbacks of Unchanged 
ODB Disbursements: The appeal is clear of
leaving the “spend” elements of the age-related
elements of the ODB entirely as they are now.
Risks would continue to be very broadly pooled, a
large amount of redistribution would continue
through the program, benefits would depend on
the interaction of patient needs with provincial
formulary and reimbursement controls, and
individuals with greater-than-average needs would
face additional costs for drugs covered by the
program. The stabilization of the current cost of
financing the program thanks to the partial
prefunding would presumably increase ODB
contributors’ confidence that they will actually
have access to the drugs the program promises.
This approach would be most clearly compatible
with a consumption-tax-based levy: all money
going into and coming out of a common pool,
with no individual earmarking. For those who
worry that financing reforms are a stalking horse
for other changes to the current system, no change
at the payment end would be reassuring.
From another perspective, though, leaving the
payment end of the program unchanged has two
key defects. Asking people to pay additional
contributions to partially prefund the ODB is
likelier to succeed if individuals see their own
contributions as funding a benefit that is, at least
in part, contingent on their participation. For
example, benefits in the CPP, while pooling risk 
of longevity, disability and so on across all
participants, are predominantly contingent on
contributing to the plan. 
Establishing a link between individual
contributions and benefits would make the
increased levy to pre-fund feel less like a tax to
those who pay it, mitigating its economic damage.
And turning part of the payout from a reformed
ODB into a cash or voucher payment, akin to an
annuity from a social-insurance pension plan,
would create an avenue whereby sensitivity to the
balance of costs and benefits for drug treatments
on the part of prescribers, pharmacists and
patients improves the health bang per buck spent.
Linking ODB Entitlements to Contribution
History: Partial prefunding along the lines
described here means that funding for the bulk of
ODB spending will still come from current
revenue when the scheme is mature. Suppose that
the bulk of ODB spending also continues to occur
as it does now. It would still be possible to create a
link between contributions and entitlements by
making a small portion of ODB spending an
individual entitlement, geared to the time period
over which the individual has contributed.
Conceptually, the eventual contribution of
investment income from the ODB Fund provides
the basis for such an arrangement, with the
individual entitlements growing as a share of total
ODB spending as the scheme matures. Making
entitlements straightforwardly dependent on that
income would make payouts from the fund too
sensitive year-by-year to changes in yields,
however, and would also produce an early and
unsustainable increase in payouts before the Fund
settles torward the target of five times expenditures.
What would make more sense would be a
blended system, whereby beneficiaries received a
base amount at the outset, followed by a transition
to flexible entitlements geared to each person’s
contributions as the system matures. If, for
example, the mature system envisioned 40 years of
contributions – say from age 25 to age 65 – as
necessary for full benefits, the transition period
could last for the initial 40 years. 
The Nature of the Entitlement: The payments
made to individuals – which would be small at
first but grow over time – could be like a voucher,
payable to insurance plans that would reimburse
for drugs. Or they could be cash payments,
available for beneficiaries to use in meeting
deductibles and co-payments. A blended system is
an option, as in Germany, where individualCommentary 326 | 15
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entitlements for long-term care may be accessed as
services with a budget limit – a quasi-voucher – or
as a cash payment of slightly less value. The latter
option comes with the risk that care needs exceed
the cash limits, which is why the frail elderly
generally prefer the service budget choice (Merlis
2004). Such payments would involve individuals
more directly in their treatments, with potential
efficiency rewards in the standard sense of cost-
effectiveness and the economic sense of better
matching to individual preferences. It would also
heighten public scrutiny of the ODB Fund,
helping ensure that the additional money raised
through the higher near-term contributions did
finance ODB expenditures.
The establishment and growth of such payouts
would support competition-based reforms like the
“Dekker-Simmons” reforms proposed in the
Netherlands in the early 1990s.
18 These reforms
were meant to encourage private plans to compete
for beneficiaries from two sources: 1) the
government; and, 2) those who pay a premium to
enrol. Plans would compete on quality of service.
And they could also compete on price, with the
important limitation that premiums would be the
same for all individuals enrolled in a given plan,
pooling the risk of needed drug treatments across
all members of each plan. Government would set
a minimum benefit package for each plan, and
plans would be obliged to accept all applicants for
coverage. The purpose would be to encourage
competition and consumer flexibility, with specific
pharmacies or physicians likely engaging with the
plans to provide their services. 
To underline the compatibility of this type of
reform with other approaches to public healthcare
financing, we note that the pay-as-you-go portion
of ODB spending could also support a capitation
system for drug treatments.
19 Either insurers or
providers could receive the individual’s entitlement
associated with prefunding along with a separate
payment geared to various risk factors. In such
systems, insurers or doctors have a budget for each
elderly individual in their care, and would have
the incentive to stay within the budget for each
individual. The additional advantage of this
system is that pharmaceutical risks would be
pooled more broadly among a random group of
retired patients. Further-reaching reforms to
publicly funded healthcare would see more people
and treatments covered by capitation systems
rather than fee-for-service; our proposals for the
age-related portion of the ODB would
complement such reforms. 
Other Issues and Implications for
Other Provinces 
Mobility
The potential that someone would pay into a
prefunded ODB and move to another jurisdiction
raises issue familiar from the CPP and other
social-security arrangements. One simple possibility
is that contributors to the new ODB would
receive whatever payment their contributions
would justify. If 40 years of contributions entitled
an individual to the maximum payment, that
entitlement would be smaller reduced by 1/40
th
for every year under the maximum. Ontario
would have no concern with how the jurisdiction
the person moves to would treat the income. 
A similarly straightforward approach could
apply to people who come to Ontario with little
or no history of ODB contributions. Individual
entitlements would be geared to contributions;
while those with no contributions would still be
entitled to benefits from the pay-as-you-go
portion, their total ODB coverage would be
smaller than those who had contributed. 
18 These proposed reforms were never fully implemented in Holland for a variety of political and competitiveness reasons. For a discussion see
Helderman et al. (2005).
19 A capitation remuneration system pays physicians’ wages based on the number of patients in his or her care; not for each individual service
provided as under a fee-for-service arrangement.C.D. Howe Institute
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Transition and Sustainability
The simulations presented here assume that the
move to the higher, sustainable, ODB
contribution occurs in equal increments over a
six-year period. Shorter transitions imply
somewhat lower sustainable contribution rates;
longer transitions, higher ones. Once the higher
level of contributions intended to be sustainable
over 50 years is reached, key factors in the stability
of the system will be – as they are for pension
plans like the CPP – changes in the contribution
base, changes in investment returns and changes
in the cost of benefits.
The CPP has provisions to trigger either
increases in contribution rates or decreases in
benefits (achieved through suspension of inflation
indexing) in the event that one of its triennial
valuations finds that it is not sustainable at its
currently legislated 9.9 percent contribution rate.
A reformed ODB could contain such provisions
for its contributions or the annuity portion of its
benefits should economic or other circumstances
not turn out as expected. 
A variation drawn from social security reforms
in Sweden would be to make the age for new
ODB eligibility the variable that moves to balance
the system. If adverse changes to the contribution
base or inflation of payouts implied a further hike
in contributions, an increase in the eligibility age
could be the change that prevents it. Indeed, since
improvements in drug treatments are likely to
contribute both to better health and longer
working life on the one hand, and greater
longevity and demand for drug treatments on the
other, increasing the age of eligibility to keep the
program in balance could make eminent sense.
Applicability to Other Provinces 
Because almost all Ontarians over the age of 65
get publicly funded drugs under the ODB, that
portion of the ODB is a particularly attractive
candidate for prefunding. The same does not
apply to all publicly funded drug plans in Canada.
In 2003, British Columbia, for example, changed
a plan that targeted support to seniors into an
income-based plan – called Fair Pharmacare
–intended to support citizens that are most in
need, regardless of age (Morgan and Coombes
2006). This shift was motivated in part by
concerns about future aging-related cost increases,
and was in the spirit of other proposals for wider
pharmacare coverage for all who lack the resources
to buy private insurance or self-insure (Blomqvist
2002; Blomqvist and Lu 2001). Alberta, by
contrast, recently considered a seniors’ drug benefit
to accompany its income-tested drug benefit, but
balked at the cost – a prefunded approach, though
more expensive up-front, would be a more fiscally
responsible way to establish such a program.
Partial prefunding for age-based pharmacare
would not preclude moves in Ontario or
elsewhere to wider public drug coverage with or
without means tests. As we have described above,
the payments from the age-related ODB would
cover drug consumption of recipients late in life:
other parts of the program could evolve in a
variety of ways without undercutting either the
rationale for partial prefunding or the mechanisms
by which the ODB Fund payments would
support overall healthcare for recipients. More
broadly, it implies nothing about governments’
ability to control treatments and costs through
other means. Partial prefunding would help
reduce intergenerational inequities and stabilize a
portion of drug-related funding – and by doing
so, might facilitate other reforms to drug and
wider healthcare policy, just as greater stability of
and confidence in the CPP cleared the air for
other reforms of contractual and voluntary
retirement incomes in Canada.
Conclusion
The reforms that partially prefunded the Canada
and Quebec Pension Plans in the 1990s provide a
useful example of changes to social insurance
programs that stabilized their costs in the face of
demographic stresses. Hikes in CPP contributions
in early years created an investment fund that is
now yielding income that will help shield future
workers from the onerous tax burden they wouldCommentary 326 | 17
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otherwise face when the babyboomers are drawing
heavily on the system. Similar reforms are possible
in healthcare, where the threat of much higher
taxes on today’s younger people – who may feel
that they are paying more for a system that will
not be there for them when they are old – is even
greater than was the case with the CPP. The ODB,
the largest element of which finances drugs for
people age 65 and up, is a striking example of a
program with aggregate numbers that make
prefunding particularly attractive.
Whether partial prefunding of the ODB is
practical depends on several considerations –
among them, the nature of the contributions, the
management of the fund, and the management of
payouts. We have provided several illustrations in
this Commentary, with particular attention to
options financed by levies on earnings above a
$3,500 minimum and 1.5 times the CPP’s YMPE,
and a payout plan in which a growing share of
ODB expenditures are distributed as payments to
individuals geared to their contribution history.
We realize that important features of such a
reform remain unclear – the potential uses of the
individual payments being a key example – and
that the political acceptability of such reforms
depends not only on their substance but on 
their presentation.
Against these difficulties, we would argue that
an unreformed system presents a bleak prospect.
Recent evidence suggests that a business-as-usual
approach to the ODB amounts to wilfully passing
an exorbitant bill to the future – risking some
combination of a taxpayer revolt and more
stringent rationing of access to drugs. Reforms
that spread foreseeable costs more evenly over
time, accompanied by greater transparency and
opportunities for better balances of costs and
benefits with improved flexibility for consumer
choice, would brighten this prospect. Canadians
have achieved such social program reforms before,
and should not doubt their ability to do so again.| 18 Commentary 326
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Appendix A: Details and Assumptions
of the Projections
Table A1: Demographic Assumptions
Source: Source: Statistics Canada and authors’ calculations.
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
(actual)
Assumptions
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)
Male 80.0 81.1 82.1 82.5 82.5 82.5
Female 83.3 84.4 85.4 86.4 87 .5 87 .5
Total Fertility Rate 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57
Net International
Migration (persons) 106,036 106,036 106,036 106,036 106,036 106,036
Net Interprovincial
Migration (persons) 2,259 0 0 0 0 0
Results
Total Population (000s) 13,220 14,755 16,102 17 ,135 17 ,874 18,388
Working-age Population (000s) 9,179 9,800 10,052 10,523 10,808 10,904
Old-Age Dependency (65+ / 15-64) (%) 19.95 26.23 35.67 39.58 41.86 44.95
Table A2: ODB Utilization Rates (share of pertinent population)
Source: Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (2009) and authors’ calculations.
Age Groups
Share of Total Population 
Age-Group (used in Figure 2)
Share of Total Population 
ge-Group (used in 
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Appendix B: Distributional Impacts of
Potential ODB Prefunding Levies
The degree to which a new ODB levy conforms
to or violates the principle of ability to pay, and in
particular the widespread expectation that people
with greater ability to pay should pay proportionately
more in taxes, will be a preoccupation for critics of
any proposal. In a social-insurance context, this
preoccupation is problematic. Social-insurance
premiums ought as a matter of design to be linked
to benefits, which makes comparisons against any
measure of wellbeing inappropriate, especially
when – as is usually the case – the incidence of
benefits by the same measure of wellbeing is not
part of the calculation.
An additional caveat to such an exercise is the
difficulty of obtaining a meaningful measure of
wellbeing. Restricting the discussion to dollar
measures, lifetime consumption would be a
superior measure – but since it is not available,
annual income tends to be used, a denominator
that will tend to make taxes that might be
proportional or even progressive with regard to
lifetime consumption look regressive.
Those caveats noted, the inevitable preoccupation
with incidence measured against annual income
inspires Table B1, which shows each of our proposed
levies against family income.
Not surprisingly, because the HST option
makes contributions to the ODB proportional 
to consumption, its correlation with income
across families is relatively weak.
The levies on CPP-like bases register as more
regressive when the cap is lower, and least so 
when there is no cap. Even when there is a cap,
higher-income families pay more – since the levy
is on individuals, multiearner families pay above
the cap. For those who favour levies that are 
most proportional to annual income, the payroll
tax without a cap would appear the most 
attractive choice.| 20 Commentary 326
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Table B1: Average Household Contributions under Alternative Financing Options, 2011
Source: Authors’ calculations using SPSD/M Version 18.
Note: The SPSD/M simulations did not give a tax credit or a deduction from taxable income. In that respect, contributions were treated like
the Ontario Health Premiums.
Census Family Employment Earnings 
Families
earning
less than $3,500 – $28,621 – $55,92 – >$95,612
$3,500 $28,620 $55,926 $95,611
Average Contributions per Census Family, $
Number of families
2.1 million 1.1 million 1.1 million 1.1 million 1.1 million
Moderate Investment Returns, Low Cost Scenario ($5.7B)
Option #1: Payroll tax of 2.9% of earnings, cap of $48,300 $0 $325 $1,067 $1,545 $2,143
Option #2: Payroll tax of 1.8% of earnings, no cap $0 $205 $688 $1,253 $2,933
Option #3: Provincial HST increase of 3.0% (from 8% to 11% total) $529 $540 $717 $1,064 $1,780
Moderate Investment Returns, Baseline Cost Scenario ($9.0B)
Option #1: Payroll tax of 4.5% of earnings, cap of $48,300 $0  $513  $1,684  $2,439  $3,383 
Option #2: Payroll tax of 2.9% of earnings, no cap $0  $323  $1,086  $1,979  $4,632 
Option #3: Provincial HST increase of 4.8% (from 8% to 12.8% total) $835  $852  $1,132  $1,681  $2,812 
Moderate Investment Returns, High Cost Scenario ($13.9B)
Option #1: Payroll tax of 7 .0% of earnings, cap of $48,300 $0 $792 $2,601 $3,768 $5,225
Option #2: Payroll tax of 4.4% of earnings, no cap $0 $499 $1,677 $3,056 $7 ,153
Option #3: Provincial HST increase of 7 .6% (from 8% to 16.4% total) $1,288 $1,315 $1,748 $2,595 $4,345
Preferred Option
Moderate Investment Returns, Low Cost Scenario ($5.7B)
Payroll tax of 2.3% of earnings, cap of $72,450 $0 $265 $890 $15,59 $2,366
Moderate Investment Returns, Baseline Cost Scenario ($9.0B)
Payroll tax of 3.7% of earnings, cap of $72,450 $0 $418 $1,406 $2,461 $3,736
Moderate Investment Returns, High Cost Scenario ($13.9B)
Payroll tax of 5.7% of earnings, cap of $72,450 $0 $646 $2,170 $3,800 $5,768Commentary 326 | 21
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